Container escape achieved. Attacker privilege: still none. Why?
The breach happened. The forensics confirmed it. Shellcode executed inside the container. Root user, full system access, network connectivity. All compromised. Everything the attacker needed to pivot was there.
None of it worked.
The escaped container had no network access to other services. Secrets were never mounted into the pod. The attacker had no credential to steal. The host firewall blocked outbound connections. The network policy denied access to the control plane. The RBAC denied any service account permissions.
The container was compromised. The architecture was not.
This is what defense in depth looks like when it actually works.
Two weeks of scrambling. Teams pulling logs. Spreadsheets cross-checking commits. Patch requests hunting for proof that code reviews actually happened. Documentation written in panic mode. Governance questions without answers. A process that lived in people's heads, not in tooling.
Then one team showed their checklist. One list. One enforcement mechanism. Every claim tied to evidence collected automatically.